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Abstract: We investigate the motives and circumstances surrounding outside
directors' decisions to publicly announce their board resignations. Directors
who leave “quietly” are in their mid-sixties and professional directors, i.e.,
retirees, who are retiring entirely from professional life. Directors who
announce their resignation are in their mid-fifties and active professionals.
Half the time they say they are leaving because they are “busy.” These
directors leave from firms with some weakness in their performance, but with
no overt manifestations of cronyism such as excessive compensation of either
the CEO or directors. The other half of the time directors leave while publicly
criticizing the firm. These directors are finance professionals who were
members of the audit and compensation committees. They resign from firms
with weak boards and financial performance with evidence that managers
have manipulated earnings upwards. Public criticism appears to pressure
these boards to make management changes associated with improved stock
price performance. We conclude that while such public resignations are
motivated by the reputational concerns of directors, they can act as a
disciplining device for poor board performance.
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1. Introduction
In this study we examine announcements of outside director
resignations to provide further insight into the incentives that outside
directors have in monitoring managers. In their seminal work, Fama
and Jensen (1983) argue that outside directors are expert decision
makers and their incentives to monitor management stem from their
desire to retain their reputation as experts. Outside directors are likely
to resign publicly when they are no longer able to effectively watch
over management, for whatever reason, as a way to keep their
reputations. An investigation into the circumstances of public
resignations can provide greater understanding into how directors and
boards function.
Outside directors are charged to protect shareholders' interests.
Yet, their ability to do so can be limited. First, meeting only a dozen or
so times of year, they are unlikely to have the time to familiarize
themselves sufficiently with the firm's operating and accounting
practices to uncover and prevent mismanagement before it has gone
too far. Moreover, they often rely on the same management for the
information that may reveal their culpability. Second, managers also
tend to control who serves on the board. Every year, in most firms,
managers nominate a slate of directors to be elected at the annual
shareholders' meeting. The nominating process, then, also acts to
compromise the independence of outside directors. Directors might be
reluctant to question and thereby lose the support of management.
Given the above limitations, one of the strongest incentives that
outside directors have to monitor is to preserve their reputation capital
and business relationships (see Fama and Jensen, 1983). Prior
researchers have argued that the value of directors' reputations
manifests itself in additional board seats and fees, stock, and options
grants that accompany those appointments (see Yermak, 2004).
Similarly loss of reputation manifests itself in the loss of board
appointments (see Fich and Shivdasani, 2007). However, these
incentives are not wholly consistent with the incentive to maximize
shareholder wealth. For one thing, outside directors may be more
concerned with their reputations for cooperating with management
than as “watch dogs” for shareholders, i.e., directors can be
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susceptible to cronyism. Specifically, cronyism can manifest itself as
the exchange of board seats for awarding excessive compensation for
the CEO or ignoring poor performance. Another thing is that, there are
likely to be higher time costs associated with discovering
mismanagement early; the longer mismanagement persists the more
likely it will be revealed with a minimal amount of the director's time
spent on discovery. Then, when there is clear and public evidence that
managers are not acting in shareholders' interests, directors may have
no choice but to act to discipline managers or they risk losing their
reputation as independent monitors. However, this makes outside
directors more of a mechanism of last resort rather than the proactive
monitors that shareholders wish them to be. For example, boards tend
to replace the CEO after a period of poor firm performance (see
Weisbach, 1988) rather than remove the CEO before the damage has
been done (see Jensen, 1993, for a more complete discussion of the
failures of internal control systems).
Furthermore, since most board decisions are by a majority
consensus, a single director relies on the support of others when
questioning management (see Mace, 1971). Different directors will
face different time costs and differing obligations to management
which can create disagreements between directors about how to fulfill
their monitoring obligation to shareholders.
Because of these tensions, board room conflicts can spill outside
the confines of the board room and into the public press. Outside
directors can resign when frustrated with a weak and ineffectual
board, but may go further and publicly criticize management as a
means of distancing themselves from a poorly performing firm. It is
also likely that outside directors will publicize their reasons for
resigning from the board when they are not leaving because of
conflicts with management. Such statements can preserve their
reputations for cooperating with management and reassure
shareholders their leaving is not a sign of hidden trouble. Likewise,
when outside directors resign publicly, but decline to provide a reason,
the director may decide to let his or her silence speak for itself.
These resignations can have consequences for shareholders.
Directors might offer a “busy” related reason for leaving a board when
the firm is in trouble, rather than criticizing the firm, because they
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seek to maintain their reputations as cooperative with management. If
so, such resignations could be indicative of managerial entrenchment,
leading to discipline from the external control market. Alternatively, if
directors, truly leave because they are busy, such resignations can
improve shareholder wealth by allowing for the appointment of a
director who can spend more time on board activities.
Resignations accompanied by public criticism can put pressure
on the remaining directors to improve firm performance. Or public
dissension in the board room may suggest that the board will be more
amenable to a takeover offer. Alternatively, these might be benign
events. They may be the actions of a lone disgruntled director or
indicative of a personality clash between the director and the CEO or
other members of the board. Then again these resignations may be
viewed negatively by the market but ultimately ineffectual in bringing
about positive change. Worse yet the firm may lose the monitoring
benefits of a good director allowing management to become even
more entrenched.2
In this study we investigate a sample of 52 outside director
resignation announcements from 1990 to 2003. We compare our
sample of public resignations to a random sample of 52 firms where
outside directors leave the board “quietly,” i.e., with no public
announcement in the financial press. These samples allow us to
investigate the circumstances around directors' decisions to publicize
their resignation independent of the decision to leave the board. We
find that half the time directors resign stating that they are busy and
the other half of the time directors announce they are resigning
because of uncooperative management or for some other problem with
the firm that is likely to reflect conflict with management.
Directors who leave “quietly” are more likely to be professional
directors, i.e., retirees, and significantly older-mid sixties—than
directors who leave publicly. These directors are more likely to be at
the end of their professional lives and less likely to feel compelled to
publicly clarify their reasons for leaving the board as a means of
preserving their reputation capital. Younger directors have more years
left in their careers and hence more to lose from a damaged
reputation. Directors who publicize their resignations are around eight
to ten years younger than those who leave “quietly.”
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Directors who resign for “busy” related reasons are more likely
to be active professionals. The firms that these directors resign from
have some weakness in performance in the period prior to the
resignation suggesting that changes in firm performance is putting
greater demands on directors. We do not find any evidence that either
the CEO or the directors are excessively compensated in these firms or
that there is upward manipulation of earnings. Thus we conclude that
these resignations are not attempts by directors to protect
management or evidence of cronyism.
Directors are more likely to resign for “conflict” related reasons
when the board is weak. These boards are less independent, smaller
and dominated by a CEO who is also chairman of the board. Consistent
with their desire to publicly distance themselves from poorly
performing firms, we find that these directors are more likely to resign
from firms with recent declines in operating performance and sales.
They are more likely to be finance professionals and been a member of
the audit and/or compensation committees. Not surprisingly, “conflict”
firms have an increase in accounting accruals, indicating that
management may be manipulating earnings to mask poor
performance. Given their financial backgrounds and/or their
membership on the audit committee, it is likely to be more
embarrassing to have served on the board of a company with
deteriorating financial performance and questionable accounting
practices.
Finally, we find evidence that public criticism of the firm
pressures the board to make changes. In the six months following
these announcements we find significantly positive market adjusted
stock price performance and a higher frequency of internal
management changes. The overall weight of the evidence suggests
that outside directors resign for “conflict” related reasons in poorly
performing firms with weak boards, perhaps to protect their own
reputation, but that such resignations ultimately are effective in
improving firm performance.
The findings of our study contribute to the vast literature on
board functioning. While there have been previous studies examining
changes in the board which have investigated the turnover of insiders
(see Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988); the addition of outsiders (Gilson,
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1990 and Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990); outside director turnover
simultaneously with a forced CEO turnover (see Farrell and Whidbee,
2000), the resignation of both inside and outside directors (see Fields
and Gupta, 2004), the resignations of outsiders prior to poor
performance (see Brown and Maloney, 1999), and resignations of
outside directors following disputes (see Agrawal and Chen, 2008), our
study is designed to specifically investigate the motivations of outside
directors' decision to publicly criticize the firm as they leave vis-à-vis
more benign departures. This study shows that self interest is likely to
motivate directors to make their disagreements public but can also be
a mechanism for disciplining managers when the board is weak.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the sample and data. Section 3 documents the types of
resignation reasons given and the stock price reaction to these
announcements. Section 4 investigates the characteristics of resigning
outside directors and the boards that they resign from. Sections 5 and
6 provide the results of univariate tests of the differences in corporate
governance characteristics and firm performance for different types of
resignation announcements. Section 7 reports the results of a
multivariate regression results for the director's choice to publicize his
or her resignation. Section 8 documents changes in stock price
performance and firm activity after the resignation announcements.
Section 9 concludes the paper with suggestions for future research.

2. Sample and data
We construct a sample of director resignations by searching
both the Wall St. Journal and Lexis/Nexis full text data base from 1990
to 2003 using various forms of the search words “director” and
“resign”. This search produced 464 articles of 735 director
resignations. Using these articles and proxy statements to confirm that
the director was an outsider, we construct a sample of 290 outside
director resignations. We classify outsiders as those who are not
employees, former employees or related to any employees of the firm.
Outside directors are also those that have no obvious affiliation with
the firm or management, such as the firm's external legal counsel,
banker, or a director that has received consulting fees, as disclosed in
the firm's proxy statement. This sample excludes directors who did not
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resign but simply let their term expire and/or resignations that were
not announced in the press. We also exclude events that are
contaminated with other announcements.
Fields and Gupta (2004) also construct a sample using a key
word search of Lexis–Nexis and report a sample of 133 “outsider”
director resignations between 1990 and 2000. They define “outsider”
directors as non-employee directors who are not also former
employees of the firm, relatives of the firm's employees, bankers,
accountants, consultants, or attorneys of the firm. Thus our initial
sample of 290 outside director resignations is comparable to that of
other studies and is likely to represent most if not all announcements.
An alternative source of director resignations announcements
are Form 8-Ks. Agrawal and Chen (2008) use 8-Ks to construct a
sample of 168 director resignations from 1995 to 2006. Under current
SEC rules firms are required to disclose whether a director resigned
because a disagreement with management and within 4 days of the
event. However, these rules were not enacted until 2004.3 Not
surprisingly, the number of resignations for disputes with management
in the Agrawal and Chen (2008) sample more than double after 2004
and over 42% of the observations in their sample occur in 2005 and
2006. The rules governing Form 8-K filings during our sample period
require that they be filed between 5 and 15 days after the occurrence
of certain material events, such as bankruptcy filings, auditor change,
change in control, and a director resignation. Firms are not required to
disclose if a director resigned because of a conflict with management.
Prior studies examining the information content of 8-Ks using a sample
period prior to 2004 have found that these forms did not provide
timely information for director resignations (see Carter and Soo,
1999). Since stock price reactions to the resignation, as well as the
reason given, are important measures in our study, we focus on
constructing a sample created from announcements rather than less
timely and informative SEC filings.
From our initial sample of announcements of outside directors,
we require firms to have sufficient data on Compustat so that we can
investigate changes in firm performance related to director
resignations. This restriction reduces our sample to seventy-eight
firms. We lose an additional fourteen firms because of insufficient data
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in CRSP to calculate stock price reactions to the resignation
announcement. Finally we lose twelve more firms because of missing
information on corporate governance characteristics available in proxy
statements and 10-K filings for the year prior to the resignation year.
Our final sample consists of 69 director resignations for 52 separate
announcements for 49 separate firms.
We also create a comparison sample of instances where outside
directors leave the firm “quietly.” We initially identify firms that are
both on Standard and Poor's Execucomp and the IRRC Directors data
base spanning the 1996–2004 period yielding 2980 firms and 25,622
unique directors for a total of 14,563 firm years. We identify 1326 firm
years where an outside director left the board “quietly”, i.e., is not
included in our announcement sample. Outside directors are those that
are identified as independent directors by the IRRC database. Our
requirement that firms have sufficient data on CRSP and Compustat
eliminates another 123 and 195 firm-years, respectively. Lastly, we
require that firms have data on blockholdings as provided through the
WRDS data base and another 453 firm-years are eliminated. The final
sample of outside director resignations consists of 555 firms. From this
sample of 555 firms we randomly pick 52 firms. We use the smaller
sample to facilitate the hand collection of data, for example, the
classification of director's primary occupations and firm events that
occur after the resignation. However, by reducing our sample size we
reduce the power of our tests. We also do not make inferences about
specific differences in variables across the different types of
resignations for the general population of outside director resignations.
Table 1, Panel A, reports the distribution over our sample period
of the number of resignation announcements from both the initial
sample and our final sample. This table shows that, while there is
variation in the frequency of resignation announcements from year to
year, there is no obvious clustering over time or trends in the
frequency of resignations for either the larger or reduced sample. The
number of directors resigning at once range from 1 to 4; the average
is 1.5 and the median is 1.
Table 1, Panel B, reports the distribution over our sample period
of the number of “quiet” resignations from both the initial sample and
our final sample. Again, there appears to be no obvious clustering over
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time in the number resignations. Because of the availability of data on
IRRC (begins in 1996) and WRDS Blockholder data base (ends in
2001), we have no observations in this sample prior to 1996 (the
announcement sample has 19 firms) or after 2001 (the announcement
sample has 11 firms). Because of the small size of the announcement
sample, we are reluctant to eliminate firms in this sample to match the
time frame of the comparison sample. However, we test whether there
are any statistically significant differences in the variables used in our
tests for the announcement sample pre- and post 1995 and pre- and
post 2001 and find none.
Our sample is not constructed to identify factors that predict the
likelihood of a public resignation, i.e., it is not random. However, the
results reported in Table 1 suggest that public resignations are
relatively infrequent events. The number of outside resignation
announcements as a percentage of all outside director turnovers
meeting our data requirements ranges between 0 and 7.55%.
“Conflict” related resignations account for roughly half of these public
resignations and thus are even more infrequent. Yet, most actions that
discipline management occur infrequently. Faleye (2007) using a
sample from 1995 to 2002 documents 219 forced CEO turnovers
among 1483 CEO replacements suggesting that CEO turnovers that
are discipline related occur 14.77% of the time. For this same sample,
Faleye (2007) documents 102 proxy contests in a sample of 11,464
firm years (or annual elections of the board) suggesting that elections
are contested or used to discipline managers less than 1% of the time.
Yet, nonetheless proxy contests and forced CEO turnovers are long
recognized events that are associated with increases in shareholder
wealth (see Dodd and Warner, 1983 and Weisbach, 1988). We also
document improvements in firm performance following the
resignations of outside directors who publicly criticize management.
Hence, while infrequent, these resignations are another important
mechanism for disciplining management and improving shareholder
wealth.
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3. Reasons given in resignation announcement
and stock price reaction
The first place we look in examining directors' motivations for
publicly resigning is the reason he or she gives in the announcement.
Table 2 shows the different types of reasons given. The most common
reason given is other professional commitments (33%), followed by
uncooperative management (23%). Less frequently, resignations also
occur in the wake of some type of regulatory investigation, i.e., an
SEC investigation of the firm's accounting practices, (6%), or company
poor performance (4%). We also find two incidences of directors
announcing that they are resigning in connection with a reduction of
their ownership stake. Because directors are likely to have better
information than other investors (see Seyhun, 1992 and Noe, 1997),
we infer that a reduction in an investment in the firm is likely to be a
negative signal. We also find that health (4%), personal, family
commitments (6%) or other time commitments (8%) are given as
reasons. Finally, about 13% of the time no reason is given in the
announcement.
We group these reasons into two categories—(1) “Conflict”
related reasons: uncooperative management; regulatory investigation
or shareholder lawsuit; ownership stake reduction; company poor
performance; and unknown; and (2) “Busy” related reasons: health,
personal, family commitments or other time commitments. Prior to the
passage of new SEC rule in 2004, companies were not required to
disclose director's resignation letters; hence many directors followed a
policy of “what happens in the board room stays in the boardroom.”4
We find that the decision to announce a resignation without providing
a reason is viewed negatively by the market; the average two day
cumulative abnormal return is − 1% (median = − 0.05%). Therefore,
we group resignation announcements that do not provide a reason
with “conflict” related reasons. To the extent that the reasons are
really benign and not “conflict” related we bias our results against
finding a difference between the two types of announcements. Our
sample contains 26 announcements for “conflict” related reasons and
26 announcements for “busy” related reasons (it is coincidental that
the sample is evenly split between the two categories). While not
reported in the tables, we find no statistical relation between year and
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type of reason announced. We use the “conflict” related reasons and
“busy” related reasons categories along with directors who leave
“quietly” in the remainder of our tests. Comparing characteristics of
firms across the three types of resignations allows us to test the
motivations and consequences of public statements accompanied by a
resignation, other than the resignation itself.
Table 3 reports the stock price reaction to the resignation
announcement depending on the reason given. For “conflict” related
reasons the one day abnormal return is − 1.17% and the 3-day
cumulative abnormal return is − 3.10%—both are statistically
significant at the 5% level. For “busy” related reasons both the one
day and the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns are positive but not
statistically different from zero. However, for a larger sample of 109
resignation announcements for which we have sufficient return data
the three day cumulative abnormal return for announcements for
resignations for “busy” related reasons it is + 1.64% and statistically
significant at the 10% level. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that the
market reacts positively when directors who they define as busy (three
or more directorships) leave the board and conclude that busy
directors are detrimental to firm value. Similarly, we find that the
market reacts positively when directors leave the board explicitly
stating that they are busy. This evidence also suggests that “busy”
related reasons are not given to protect poorly performing managers.

4. Characteristics of outside directors resigning
In this section we investigate the characteristics of directors
who resign for different reasons. We use four categories for our tests
of types of directors. First, we group executives who are retired from
their primary profession as “professional” directors. Because these
directors are retired the time cost associated with monitoring is likely
to be less, which, in turn, is likely to make them better monitors (see
Brickley et al., 1994). It is also likely that these directors are less likely
to resign for “busy” related reasons. Second, we group directors who
are accountants, commercial bankers, corporate finance officers,
investment professionals, individual investors, or directors who are
retired from these professions as “finance professionals” (retired
finance professionals are excluded from the “professional directors”
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category). Agrawal and Chadha (2005) provide evidence that
independent directors with financial expertise are valuable in providing
oversight of a firm's financial reporting practices. Third, we group
together all other executives. Finally, all other types of outside
directors are classified as “other”. This last category includes
academics, past or current government officials or members of public
policy commissions, philanthropists, and members of other
professions, i.e., medical.
We also collect data on whether outside directors are on the
audit, compensation or nominating committee. Prior researchers have
found that outside directors on the audit committee can have an
influence on the firm's accounting policies (see Xie et al., 2003). We
collect data on director's stock ownership. We also collect data on CEO
and director tenure and measure the number of years that the director
and CEO have served together. Further we create a variable, (CEO
tenure/Director tenure), as a measure of the CEO's relative power over
the director; a CEO who has been at the firm longer than a director
may have more influence over board decisions. All of our data is
collected using the last proxy statement that is issued prior to the
resignation announcement date or the year prior to the resignation
year for the comparison sample using the IRRC data base.
Table 4 reports our results. We create three sub-samples of
firms based on the reason given for the resignation—“conflict,” “busy,”
and “non-public”. We test whether there are differences between
outside directors who resign and those who stay within each subsample as well as differences in resigning director characteristics
across the three different sub-samples. We use the myriad of the test
results reported in Table 4 to develop a profile of the archetypal
director who resigns for each of the three reasons described below. For
individual test results, we refer the reader to Table 4.
Outside directors resigning for “conflict” related reasons are
active professionals and more likely to have financial backgrounds
compared to directors resigning for other reasons. They are in their
mid-fifties suggesting that they still have many years left in their
careers. In the context of poor firm financial performance, these
directors have a strong incentive to distance themselves from the firm
to preserve their reputations as financial experts. They are also more
Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 16, No. 1 (February 2010): pg. 38-52. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article
to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

12

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

likely to be on the audit and/or compensation committees. Their
financial expertise coupled with committee membership suggests that
they also are likely to have both greater knowledge and concern about
either the company's accounting practices (external reporting or
internal controls) and/or the company's financial results. Finally, they
have higher stock ownership. Their higher ownership stake provides
another reason to be concerned about the financial performance of the
firm.
Directors who resign for “busy” related reasons are also in their
mid-fifties and still active professionals and busy. They are less likely
to be on the compensation committee. This suggests that these
directors are less likely to have conflicts with the CEO and CEO
compensation. It may also be the case that they were not assigned
committee membership because they were busy. Finally, they have a
relatively short tenure compared to the CEO. It is possible that the
director is concerned that a dominant CEO will be problematic in the
future and decides to leave the board, citing, he or she is too “busy.”
Alternatively, a dominant CEO may put greater demands on directors
causing some of them to leave because they are too “busy.”
Directors who leave “quietly” are more likely to be professional
directors. These directors are around 65 years old suggesting that they
are retiring, entirely, from professional life as well as the board. Unlike
younger outside directors who resign publicly to protect future
opportunities, if directors who leave “quietly” are retiring, they will not
be compelled to explain their exit. Additional findings confirm that they
are retiring entirely from professional life. They have relatively longer
tenures and have served more years with the CEO, indicating
retirement after a lengthy period of service on the board. They are less
likely to be on either the audit or compensation committee. As
directors approach retirement, the board may remove them from
committees as part of succession planning.

5. Corporate governance characteristics
In this section, we investigate the corporate governance
characteristics of firms where directors resign for different reasons. We
test for differences in board characteristics, CEO compensation, and
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outside ownership across the three sub-samples of firms with different
types of resignations—“conflict,” “busy,” and “nonpublic.”
Table 5 reports the frequency of different types of directors and
their committee membership. Firms with outside directors resigning for
both “conflict” and “busy” related reasons are less likely to have
professional directors serving on the board. There are two
explanations for this finding. Firms that are likely to have directors
leaving “quietly” are more likely to be firms with director retirements.
As a result, these firms are likely to have more professional retirees
serving on their boards to begin with. Alternatively, and more
importantly, firms with less professional retirees may be less effective
in fulfilling their monitoring function because of greater time
constraints faced by most directors on the board. The expectation of
time spent on board matters might increase for each director serving
on the board without retired professionals able to shoulder more.
Hence, directors may be more inclined to resign, stating they are “too
busy” to serve on these boards. Further, boards made up of
professionals who have less time to spend on board matters may fail
to adequately monitor managers and become dysfunctional. Hence,
directors may be more inclined to resign publicly criticizing the firm.
Our results on firm performance support the second alternative.
Committee membership also differs across the three types of
resignations. Table 5 shows that for firms with public resignations, the
audit committees have proportionately more finance professionals.
However, firms with “conflict” related resignations have more insiders
on this committee where finance professionals are more likely to come
in conflict with management about accounting policies and the
financial performance of the firm. The composition of the
compensation committee provides additional evidence of board
dysfunction for these firms. For “conflict” firms, this committee has
proportionately less professional directors, who by virtue of being
closer to retirement are less beholden to management, and more
insiders, who have obvious conflicts of interests in serving on this
committee. This committee composition is likely to be another
manifestation of a weaker board structure as discussed below.
Table 6, Panel A, reports other board characteristics. The
percentage of outside directors on the board and board size are
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smaller for firms with “conflict” related resignations. Prior researchers
(see Brickley et al., 1997 and Goyal and Park, 2002) have found
evidence that suggests that CEO's who are also Chairman of the Board
are more likely to have greater control over the board so we also
examine the frequency with which the CEO is also Chairman of the
Board across the three types of resignations. We find that the CEO is
more likely to be the chairman of the board for firms where outside
directors have resigned for “conflict” related reasons. An outside
director may be pushed to resign in protest when conflicts cannot be
resolved internally with a CEO who dominates a smaller, less
independent, board's deliberations.
Additionally, we investigate whether there are differences in
total stock ownership held by outside directors and director
compensation. Higher stock ownership is likely to increase incentives
for outside directors to monitor and may counter other weak board
characteristics. Low director compensation could be a source of
disagreement between directors and management while, higher
compensation (and stock ownership acquired through grants) could be
indications of cronyism (see Brick et al., 2006). However, as Table 6,
Panel A shows, we find no statistically significant differences in these
variables across firms with different resignation types.
We also report the percentage of directors who resign for each
resignation announcement. Table 6, Panel A, shows that, roughly,
when an outside director resigns for “conflict” related reasons another
outside director also resigns with him or her suggesting that conflicts
with management are unlikely to be isolated personal disputes. We
also find that an insider is less likely to resign when an outside director
resigns for “busy” related reasons. Changes in business conditions for
the firm may increase demands on already “busy” directors but also
may increase advancement opportunities for insiders. In fact, as
discussed later, we do find an increase in management changes for
these firms.
Table 6, Panel B, reports various characteristics of the CEO—
age, tenure, total compensation, incentive compensation, and
ownership. We scale total compensation by both sales and operating
income to control for compensation differences related to size and
operating performance. We find no evidence that the CEO of firms with
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“conflict” resignations is overpaid. We also never find that a director
gives excessive CEO compensation as a reason for resigning (we find
one case in the larger sample of 735 resignations but this
announcement did not make it into our final sample). Since
compensation contracts are negotiated in advance, they are less likely
later to trigger a director's resignation ex post. We also find that CEOs
of firms with “conflict” resignations have more stock ownership. CEO
ownership may be another dimension of CEO domination of the board
for these firms as discussed above.
Finally, we collect data on outside blockholders. The presence of
blockholders can put added pressure on firms to perform well (see
Dahya et al., 2008, Denis and Serrano, 1996 and Peck, 1996). It is
likely that the absence of a large blockholder is another dimension of
poor corporate governance for firms with “conflict” related
resignations. However, Table 6, Panel C, shows that the presence of
an outside blockholders in firms with resignations for “conflict” related
reasons is at least as strong as in the other firms. Hence, we conclude
that the absence of a large blockholder does not explain directors'
decisions to leave the firm and publicly criticize management.

6. Firm characteristics
In this section we test for differences in various measures of
firm performance between firms with the three types of resignations.
We exclude fiscal year end data from the year of the resignation
announcement or the “event” year to avoid contaminating our results
with changes in firm performance that occur after the director has
resigned. Resignation announcements can occur throughout the fiscal
year making it difficult to determine within that year the causal
relation between fiscal year results and the director resignation. 5 For
our comparison sample we use the three fiscal years prior to the
resignation year. Table 6, Panel D, reports the results of these tests.
Our results show that firms with public resignations are larger
than firms where directors leave quietly. Larger firms are likely to be
more closely followed by the financial press and hence report directors'
reasons for resigning. Hence, we control for size in our multivariate
tests. We also find differences in that the beta of firms between the
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three sub-samples and control for beta in all of our subsequent tests.
Finally we collect data on the frequency of two-digit SIC codes of the
two types of firms and find over thirty codes are represented with no
more than five observations represented by any one code in any one
resignation category (and only one with five). We conclude that
industry classification is not related to the type of resignation
announcement.
We also investigate whether firm performance explains the type
of resignation. We hypothesize that changes in performance are more
likely to be triggers for resignations than levels alone. For example,
suppose we have two firms with the same level of performance. One of
these is a more profitable firm that had a decline in profits, while the
other was a less profitable firm that improved. We predict that the
former firm is more likely to have a director that resigns for a “conflict”
related reason.
We collect data on changes in sales and operating income as
two key measures of performance. Table 6, Panel D, shows that after
a period of increases in sales and operating performance, both decline
for firms with “conflict” related resignation during the year prior to the
resignation. Such conditions can lead to conflict in the boardroom. For
firms with “busy” related resignations, firm performance remains
relatively stable while for firm with “quiet” resignations, firm
performance improves.
Table 6, Panel D, also reports the results for other measures of
performance—average annual percentage sales growth in the three
years prior, operating margins (EBITDA/Sales), and percentage of
firms reporting a loss, and market adjusted stock price performance
six and twelve months prior to the resignation year. The overall weight
of the evidence on all of these performance measures show that firms
with resignation announcement for “conflict” related reasons have
poorer performance than firms with either resignation announcements
for “busy” related reasons or firms with “quiet” resignations. We also
find that firms with resignations for “busy” related reasons have
weaker performance than firms with “quiet” resignations. Weak firm
performance can create greater demands on directors.
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Finally, we investigate whether there are differences between the
three types of firms in changes in accounting accruals. Table 6, Panel
D, shows that firms with “conflict” related resignation announcements
are more likely to have greater positive changes in accruals. This
indicates that management may be manipulating accruals to mask
poor performance creating another source of conflict between directors
and management.6

7. Likelihood of resigning for “conflict” related
reasons
Table 7 reports the results of a logit regression for the likelihood
that an outside director resigns publicly for “conflict” or “busy” related
reasons or leaves “quietly.” We include variables that identify who
these directors are and what types of firms they resign from. We
report these multivariate results to confirm our earlier findings.
The results in Table 7 show that an outside director is more
likely to resign for “conflict” related reasons when the director is a
financial professional and a member of the audit or compensation
committee. Directors are also more likely to resign in protest when
operating performance is lower and accounting accruals are higher.
These findings are consistent with our earlier results.
Our results also show that directors who resign for “busy”
related reasons are more likely to resign from firms where the CEO
has greater tenure than they do. As discussed earlier these could be
indications of either a greater demand on their time or cronyism. The
regression results are not consistent with findings of cronyism;
directors are more likely to resign for “busy” related reasons as CEO
compensation falls. In addition, the results also show that these
resignations are more likely to occur for firms with smaller, more
independent boards, where the CEO is less likely to be chairman of
board. These findings are not consistent with cronyism.
Table 7 also shows that outside directors are more likely to
resign for “busy” related reasons when sales growth and operating
performance are low, but there are recent increases in operating
profits. It appears that while these firms that have some softening in
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their financial performance, they also have some indication of future
improvement. Implementing and monitoring plans for improved
performance may put greater demands on director's time leading to
more decisions to leave for “busy” related reasons.
Table 7 also shows that, consistent with our earlier findings,
directors are more likely to leave “quietly” when they are older
professional directors and have not served on either the audit or
compensation committee. Directors are also more likely to leave
“quietly” as the CEO compensation increases and firm performance is
higher and has recently been improving. While the higher level CEO
compensation might be an indication of entrenchment, this
interpretation is tempered by the higher level of firm financial
performance. Finally, in contrast to firms where directors leave for
“conflict” related reasons, the results in Table 7 show, that in firms
where directors leave “quietly,” the change in total accruals are
negative suggesting there is no attempt to manipulate accruals to
improve financial results.

8. Changes after the resignation
In this section we investigate changes in the frequency of firm
events and shareholder returns after the resignation. Table 8, Panel A
reports market adjusted shareholder returns for six and twelve months
following the announcement. Seven firms have less than six months of
return data. For the months that data is no longer available for these
firms, their return is replaced with the return on the S&P 500 so that
the market adjusted performance is zero for these months. All seven
firms that were delisted have resignation announcements that are
“conflict” related. Two firms filed for Chapter 11. One firm was delisted
and litigated by the SEC for overstatement of revenue. Another firm
was delisted for poor financial performance and at the time of delisting
was likely to be sold. Two firms were taken over.
Table 8, Panel A shows that in the six months following
resignation announcements for “conflict” related reasons both the
average and median market adjusted performance is positive and
statistically significant. None of the other returns reported are
statistically significant. These findings support the notion that
resignations accompanied by public criticism of management can lead
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to improvements in shareholder wealth. It is also possible that the
improved share price performance for firms with “conflict” related
resignations represents a reversion to the mean after a period of poor
share price performance as documented in Table 6, Panel D.
We collect data on the frequency of events that occur after the
resignation to further understand the changes that lead to the
improvements in shareholder wealth. Of the seven firms that were
delisted as described above, the two with takeovers will increase
shareholder wealth with the offer of a takeover premium. The reasons
for the delisting of the other five firms—bankruptcy and SEC
litigation—are likely to be associated with a decrease shareholder
wealth. In Panel B of Table 8 we report the frequency of events other
than those that led to the delisting of the seven firms above—focusing
on management changes, asset restructuring and control related
events. We also report “other” types of events, such as SEC
investigations and miscellaneous lawsuits. However, the frequency of
these events is too low to be meaningful.
We find that there is a higher frequency of internal management
changes, such as changes in the CEO or other top executives for firms
with “conflict” related resignations. This suggests that remaining board
members feel pressure to “shake up” management after a director
leaves while publicly criticizing the firm. There is also an increase in
the frequency of the adoption of control defenses after directors leave
for “conflict” reason. Hence, some firms may become further
entrenched.
We use a multivariate regression analysis to sort out the various
scenarios for both share price performance and the likelihood of an
event. We include both the reasons given by the resigning director,
resigning director characteristics, the occurrence of other events,
board characteristics, and performance measures in these regressions.
We also include a dummy variable indicating whether the firm was
delisted. Our results are reported in Table 9. The six month market
adjusted return is statistically significantly higher when a “conflict”
related reason is given in the resignation announcement after
controlling for other variables. Table 9 also shows that the likelihood of
an internal control change increases with “conflict” related
resignations. Of course, it is possible that outside directors resign
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because they anticipate these changes. It is also possible that the
dissenting director was preventing the board from moving forward with
management changes. Yet, no matter what the director's or the
boards' motivations, the public criticism is likely to create added
pressure and in turn increase the likelihood of the board acting.
We also find that internal management changes increase with
resignations for “busy” related reasons. Changes in executive positions
can reflect an increase in the “busyness” for the firm. Our results also
show internal control change events are less likely when the resigning
outside director was a member of the compensation committee. This
may reflect disagreements about compensation, executive changes,
and, ultimately entrenchment. Finally, Table 9 also reports the results
of regression of the likelihood of a control defense and shows that the
parameter estimate for “conflict” related reason is statistically
insignificant. Thus our findings show that a director resigning in
protest does not increase managerial entrenchment.

9. Conclusion
In this study we investigate a sample of outside director
resignation announcements from 1990 to 2003. We also investigate a
comparison sample of firms where an outside director leaves “quietly,”
i.e., with no public announcement. Outside directors who resign in
protest are more likely to be finance professionals and so do from
firms with weak boards and a recent decline in performance. Directors
who resign claiming they are “too busy” are active professionals who
are likely, in fact, to be busy. We find no evidence that these directors
claim they are busy to protect entrenched management. Non public
resignations appear to be ordinary retirements. We conclude that
directors resign publicly to protect their professional reputations. Yet,
resignations for “conflict” related reasons are followed with a higher
frequency of internal management changes along with positive market
adjusted returns. The overall weight of the evidence suggests that
while directors self interest might prompt public criticism of the firm it
also forces the board to act to improve shareholder wealth.
Thus this study examines a sample where monitoring has
failed—directors resign when they feel they can no longer monitor the
CEO. Our findings provide additional insight into the forces that create
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an ineffective board. We find that directors resign publicly from firms
with less professional directors on the board from firms that are
struggling with performance. This suggests the importance of
populating boards with professional directors. Future study of these
directors is needed to clarify their role in board functioning and its
impact on firm value.
Our findings also highlight the use of public statements
criticizing management as another corporate governance mechanism
available to pressure management to act in shareholders' interests.
Another example is hedge funds that make critical statements of
management in the press to both pressure management and to signal
to other hedge funds to buy shares to provide additional shareholder
support for either internal change or a takeover.7 Other examples of
the use of the press as a corporate governance mechanism warrant
further identification and study.
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actions by the SEC speak to the importance of these
events to shareholders.
4 "More Directors Are Breaching the Boardroom Wall of
Silence," Phyllis Plitch, www.CareerJournal.com, from The
Wall Street Journal Online.
5 Quarterly financial results using expectations models
that adjust for both seasonal as well as prior performance
would provide more timely information about firm
performance and a better test of the relation between
resignations and firm performance. However, the data
requirements for these tests would reduce our already
small sample. Yet, to the extent that we have less precise
data, the power of our tests are reduced and biased
against finding a relation.
6Admittedly, there are better methodologies available for
detecting earnings manipulation than changes in total
accruals alone (see Dechow et al., 1995). These
methodologies are designed to control for both the firm's
"normal" accrual generating process as well as changes in
non-discretionary accruals that are performance related.
However, these methodologies have greater data
requirements that would further reduce our already small
sample. For example, the data requirements for the Jones
(1991) model would reduce our announcement sample by
50%. However, we control for changes in performance in
our multivariate tests of the relation between accrual
changes and the likelihood of resigning for different
reasons. This provides some control, albeit a crude one,
for accrual changes related to performance.
7 See "Airing a CEO's laundry," Pierre Paulden,
Institutional Investor, New York: Jun 2006. pg. 1.
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Appendix
Table 1. Samples of outside director resignations from 1990 to 2003.
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1990

58

18

0

–

–

–

–

–

–

1991

86

41

6

1.5

–

–

–

–

–

1992

45

8

0

–

–

–

–

–

–

1993

75

25

4

1.5

–

–

–

–

–

1994

41

15

4

2.0

–

–

–

–

–

1995

61

31

5

1.8

–

–

–

–

–

1996

41

13

5

1.8

154

95

5.00

10

1.23

1997

62

30

3

1.7

151

78

3.70

9

1.21

1998

68

22

8

1.8

159

98

7.55

12

1.09

1999

35

13

3

1.0

173

96

3.03

8

1.21

2000

35

6

0

–

177

105

0.00

7

1.13

2001

22

12

3

1.0

150

83

3.49

6

1.16

2002

66

35

3

1.0

197

–

–

–

2003

40

21

8

1.1

165

–

–

–

Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 16, No. 1 (February 2010): pg. 38-52. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article
to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

26

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.
Panel B: Random sample of 52 firms with
outside directors leaving with no public
announcement

Panel A: Sample of 52 announcements of
outside director resignations
All
directo
r
resigna
tions
genera
Year ted by
key
word
search
of
Lexis–
Nexis
TOTA
735
L

Outside
Number
director
of firms
resignati
in final
ons
sample
verified
meeting
with
data
proxy
requirem
stateme
ents
nt

Averag
e
number
of
outside
director
s
resigni
ng per
firm

Percenta
ge of
Firms
Averag
turnovers
wher Number
e
meeting
e
of firms
Rand number
data
outsi meeting
om
of
requirem
de
data
samp outside
ents that
direc requirem
le
directo
are
tor
ents
rs
publicly
left
leaving
announce
d

290

69

1326

52

555

52

72

Notes: Outside directors are not employees, former employees or related to any
employees of the firm, nor have any obvious affiliation with the firm or management,
as disclosed in the firm's proxy statement or an independent director as defined by the
IRRC database.

Table 2. Stated reasons for resignation on announcement for a sample of 52
announcements of outside director resignations from 1990–2003.
Number of
announcements

Percentage of
sample

“Conflict” related reasons
Uncooperative management

12

23%

Regulatory investigation or
shareholder lawsuit

3

6%

Director's ownership stake reduced

2

4%

Company poor performance

2

4%

Unknown

7

13%

26

50%

Other professional commitments

17

33%

Time constraint

4

8%

Family business

3

6%

Miscellaneous and health problems

2

4%

Sub-total

26

50%

Total

52

100%

Sub-total
“Busy” related reasons

Notes: Outside directors are not employees, former employees or related to any
employees of the firm, nor have any obvious affiliation with the firm or management,
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as disclosed in the firm's proxy statement or an independent director as defined by the
IRRC database.

Table 3. Stock price reaction to announcement for a sample of 52
announcements of outside director resignations from 1990–2003.
Event day

Resignation
reason

Abnormal
return (Z
statistic)

Mean
standardized
prediction error
(number of
observations)

Abnormal
return (Z
statistic)

Mean
standardized
prediction error
(number of
observations)

− 0.202 (52)*

− 1.19%
(− 0.918)

− 0.129 52

“Conflict” related − 1.17%
reasons
(− 2.59)

− 0.517 (26)**

− 3.10%
(− 2.11)

− 0.422 (26)**

“Busy” related
reasons

0.113 (26)

0.72%
(0.83)

0.165 (26)

2.15

F-value

2.49

0.0861

p-value

0.1211

All reasons

− 0.57%
(− 1.44)

Window (− 2, + 1)

0.03%
(0.57)

ANOVA test of
F-value
difference across
type of
p-value
resignation
reason

Notes: * and ** reflect statistical significance at the 10% level and 5% level
respectively.
Abnormal returns are measured as the return minus a market model return. The
market model is estimated as E(rit) = αit + βit(Rmt). The CRSP (NASDAQ) valueweighted index is used as the market index for CRSP (NASDAQ) listed firms. The
regression is estimated using 200 daily returns 120 days prior to the announcement.
Statistical significance is based on Z statistics calculated according to the standardized
prediction errors method given in the appendix in Dodd and Warner (1983).
Outside directors are not employees, former employees or related to any employees of
the firm, nor have any obvious affiliation with the firm or management, as disclosed in
the firm's proxy statement or an independent director as defined by the IRRC
database.

Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 16, No. 1 (February 2010): pg. 38-52. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article
to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

28

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Table 4. Characteristics of resigning directors for a sample of 104 firms with
outside director resignations from 1990–2003 (percentages are of total
number of directors for each column).
Resignations for
“conflict” related
reasons
Outside
directors
resigning

Nonresigning
outside
directors

Resignations for
“busy” related
reasons
Outside
directors
resigning

Nonresigning
outside
directors

Directors leaving for
nonpublic reasons

Outside
directors
leaving

Outside
directors
staying

Professional
director

9.3%***a

8.70

7.7

15.28

37.5

18.8***b

Financial
professional

30.2

21.7

19.2

25.00

19.4

17.6

Other
professional

48.8

56.0

50.0

46.53

33.3

(46.9)

Other

11.6

13.59

23.1

13.19

9.7

16.7

Total

43

184

26

144

72

335

Member of audit
committee

60.5%***a

42.93**b

53.9

54.86

31.9

45.1**b

Member of
compensation
committee

53.5***a

45.65

34.6

54.17

18.05

47.2

Member of
nominating
committee

12.82

87.2

14.6

24.3

20.8

35.2**b

Average age
(median)

55.0***c
(55)***c

55.8 (56)

58.26
(58)***d

58.9 (60)

64.4***e,
***f
(67)***e,
***f

58.6***g
(59)

Average
1.33%
percentage stock (0.05)
ownership by
director (median)

0.02***g
(0.00)

0.06 (0.02) 0.07 (0.00) 0.08
(0.00)*f

Average director
tenure (years)
(median)

6.9***c
(3.5)***c

6.8 (5.0)

5.8 (4.0)

7.9 (6.0)

14.6***e, 7.9***g
***f (11.0) (6.0)***g

Average number
of years served
with CEO
(median)

4.1*c (3.0)

4.4 (4.0)

4.7 (3.0)

5.1 (3.0)

5.9 (4.0)

4.4**g
(3.0)

Average CEO
tenure/director
tenure (median)

2.5
(1.8)***c

2.1 (1.3)

4.3***d
(2.0)***d

2.6
(1.1)**f

1.4**f
(0.5)***e,
***f

1.9
(1.0)***g

0.06
(0.00)**g

Notes: *, **, and *** reflect statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively. Differences in frequencies tested using a chi-square test; differences in
means tested using a Student's t-test; differences in medians tested using Wilcoxon
signed rank test.
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a Denotes the statistical significance of the association between the type of director
resigning or committee membership and the reason given.
b Denotes the statistical significance of the association between the resigning and nonresigning director types and committee membership within each of the three subsamples for the reason given for resignation.
c Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “conflict” related
resignations versus all others.
d Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “conflict” related
resignations versus firms with “busy” related resignations.
e Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “conflict” related
resignations versus firms with non-public resignations.
f Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “busy” related
resignations versus firms with non-public resignations.
g Denotes the statistical significance of the difference between resigning directors and
directors who stay within the same firm.
Data is collected using the proxy statement prior to the resignation announcement or
the year prior to the resignation year using the IRRC database.
Professional directors are executives that have retired from their primary profession.
Financial professionals include accountants, commercial bankers, corporate finance
executives, investment professionals, individual investors, commercial bankers, and
accountants.
Other professionals include corporate executives, lawyers, and consultants.
Others include academics, past or current government officials or members of public
policy commissions, philanthropists, or members of other professions.
Stock ownership is defined as all beneficially owned stock, including options
exercisable within six months and stock held by family members that the board
member disclaims any beneficial interest in.
Outside directors are not employees, former employees or related to any employees of
the firm, nor have any obvious affiliation with the firm or management, as disclosed in
the firm's proxy statement or an independent director as defined by the IRRC
database.
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Table 5. Characteristics of boards for a sample of 104 firms with outside
director resignations from 1990–2003 (percentages are of total number of
directors for each column).
Firms with outside Firms with outside
directors resigning directors resigning
for “conflict”
for “busy” related
related reasons
reasons

Firms with outside
directors leaving with
no public
announcement

Total board
Professional
director

5.85%

9.96

17.05***a

Financial
professional

15.50

17.01

13.83

Other
professional

36.55

32.78

34.28

Other

8.77

9.96

11.93

Insider

33.33

30.29

22.92

Total

342

241

528

Audit committee
Professional
director

5.13%

17.20

25.84***a

Financial
professional

29.91

30.11

15.17

Other
professional

45.30

35.48

44.94

Other

9.40

17.20

11.80

Insider

10.26

0.00

2.25

Total

117

93

178

Compensation committee
Professional
director

6.56%

20.22

23.12***a

Financial
professional

21.31

31.46

14.45

Other
professional

51.64

37.08

49.71

Other

9.02

8.99

11.56

Insider

11.48

2.25

1.16

Total

122

89

173

13.21

23.40

Nominating committee
Professional
director

8.70%
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Firms with outside Firms with outside
directors resigning directors resigning
for “conflict”
for “busy” related
related reasons
reasons

Firms with outside
directors leaving with
no public
announcement

Financial
professional

6.52

15.09

14.18

Other
professional

56.52

33.93

43.26

Other

13.04

15.09

13.48

Insider

15.22

22.64

5.67

Total

46

53

141

Notes: *, **, and *** reflect statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively. Differences in frequencies tested using a chi-square test.
a Denotes the statistical significance between the association of director type and
committee membership and the reason given for the resignation.
Data is collected using the proxy statement prior to the resignation announcement of
the year prior to the resignation year in the IRRC database.
Professional directors are executives that have retired from their primary profession.
Financial professionals include (both retired and active) accountants, commercial
bankers, corporate finance executives, investment professionals, individual investors,
commercial bankers, and accountants.
Other professionals include corporate executives, lawyers, and consultants.
Others include academics, past or current government officials or members of public
policy commissions, philanthropists, or members of other professions.
Outside directors are not employees, former employees or related to any employees of
the firm, nor have any obvious affiliation with the firm or management, as disclosed in
the firm's proxy statement or independent directors as defined by the IRRC database.
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Table 6. Firm characteristics for a sample of 104 firms with outside director
resignations from 1990–2003.
Firms with
resignation
announcements
for “conflict”
related reasons

Firms with
Firms with
resignation
outside directors
announcements
leaving with no
for “busy” related
public
reasons
announcement

Panel A: Board characteristics
Average percentage of 66.60%***a
outside directors on the (70.00)***a
board (median)

72.14 (71.36)

76.73***c
(78.89)***c

Board size

9.46 (8.00)***d

10.15***c
(10.00)***c

Percentage of firms
61.54%⁎a
where CEO is chairman
of the board

38.46 ⁎b

40.38

Average percentage
stock ownership of all
outside directors
(median)

0.037% (1.21)

5.89 (0.90)

4.73 (0.58)

Annual retainer fee as
a percentage of sales
(median)

0.029623%
(0.005823)

0.004755
(0.001657)*b

0.016403
(0.011228)

Average percentage of
directors resigning
(median)

24.48%***a
(20.00)***a

14.56***b
(12.50)***b, *d

17.55**c
(14.29)**c

Average percentage of
outsider directors
resigning (median)

39.47%***a
(30.95)**a

20.35% ***b
(16.67)*** b

20.39***c
(18.18)***c

Percentage of firms
where an inside
director also resigns

24.48%

14.56 ***b, ***d

30.77

8.12***a
(8.00)***a

Panel B: CEO characteristics
Average age (median)

51.12*a (50)*a

53.88 (53)

55.77**c (56)**c

Average total cash
compensation as a
percentage of sales
(median)

0.77% (0.25)

0.45 (0.16)

0.96**c (0.49)

Average percentage
stock ownership
(median)

6.68%*a (2.13)*a

5.19 (0.76)

2.27**c
(0.59)***c

Average stock options
granted as percentage
of shares outstanding
(median)

0.03% (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)***c

Average total
compensation as a

0.80%**a (0.36)

0.47 (0.16)

3.91*c, ***d
(1.15)***c, ***d
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Firms with
resignation
announcements
for “conflict”
related reasons

Firms with
Firms with
resignation
outside directors
announcements
leaving with no
for “busy” related
public
reasons
announcement

percentage of sales
(median)
Average total
compensation as a
percentage of EBITDA
(median)

20.59% (3.07)

4.12 (2.65)

20.88***d
(9.80)***c, ***d

Average CEO tenure
(years) (median)

7.21 (6.5)

10.58*b (8)

8.27 (6)

Panel C: Outside ownership characteristics
Average number of
outside blockholders
(median)

2.31 (2)

1.88 (2)

1.67*c (2)

Average percentage of
shares outstanding
held by outside
blockholders (median)

13.81% (9.96)

6.87 (7.38)***b

15.62***d
(13.38)

2590.18
(441.37)*b

582.02**d
(185.23)

Panel D: Firm performance
Average total assets in $3848.57 (80.08)
year prior to
resignation year
($ millions) (median)
Average total sales in
year prior to
resignation year
($ millions) (median)

$ 2911.84 (212.88) 3754.95 (425.36)

764.08**d
(142.04)

Average beta in year
prior to resignation
year (median)

0.60*a (0.47)***a

0.90*b (0.91)*b

0.95*c (0.77)*c

Average change in
0.18 (0.09)
sales from prior
year/total beginning
period assets two years
prior to resignation
year (median)

0.25 (0.21)

0.002***d
(0.00)***c, ***d

Average change in
sales from prior
year/total beginning
period assets in year
prior to resignation
year (median)

0.08***a
(0.00)***a

0.21 (0.07 )*b

1.78***d, ***c
(0.95)***c, ***d

Average change in
EBITDA from prior

35.66*a (0.00)

0.61*b
(− 0.00)***b

0.00 (0.00)***d
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Firms with
resignation
announcements
for “conflict”
related reasons

Firms with
Firms with
resignation
outside directors
announcements
leaving with no
for “busy” related
public
reasons
announcement

year/total beginning
period assets two years
prior to resignation
year (median)
Average change in
EBITDA from prior
year/total beginning
period assets in year
prior to resignation
year (median)

− 0.54**a
(− 0.01)**a, ***e

0.39 (0.00)*b

0.26**c
(0.22)***c, *d

Average EBITDA/total − 1.26***a
beginning period assets (0.010)***a
in year prior to
resignation year
(median)

− 0.03 (0.01)

1.87***c, ***d
(1.76)***c, ***d

Average sales/total
1.58***a
beginning period assets (1.21)***a
in year prior to
resignation year
(median)

1.36 (1.07)

14.76***c, ***d
(12.05)***c, ***d

Average annual
percentage sales
growth in the three
years prior to
resignation year
(median)

21.01 (12.15)

15.62 (8.00)

Average operating
− 10.25%**a
margins in year prior to (0.01)***a
resignation year
(median)

− 0.44 (0.00)

0.18*c (0.16)***c

Percentage of firms
reporting a loss

53.85%***a

38.46

7.69 ***c

Average change in
(total
accruals/beginning
period sales) in year
prior to resignation
year (median)

0.32***a
(0.02)***a

0.01*b (− 0.00)*b

− 0.44***c, ***d
(− 0.42)***c,
***d

15.26% (8.43)

Average market
− 17.90%***a
adjusted stock return
(0.0477)
performance six
(− 10.246)
months prior to
resignation (p-value for
test of difference from
zero) (median)

3.29***b (0.5458) − 9.12***c
(0.45)
(0.0254) (− 4.92)
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Firms with
resignation
announcements
for “conflict”
related reasons
Average market
− 40.44***a
adjusted stock return
(0.0001) (− 5.26)
performance twelve
months prior to
resignation (p-value for
test of difference from
zero) (median)

Firms with
Firms with
resignation
outside directors
announcements
leaving with no
for “busy” related
public
reasons
announcement
(9.05)***b
(0.5463) (0.35)

− 7.45***d
(0.2495)
(− 10.23)

Notes: *, **, and *** reflect statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively. Differences in frequencies tested using a chi-square test; differences in
means tested using a Student's t-test; differences in medians tested using Wilcoxon
signed rank test.
a Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “conflict” related
resignations versus all others.
b Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “conflict” related
resignations versus firms with “busy” related resignations.
c Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “conflict” related
resignations versus firms with non-public resignations.
d Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “busy” related
resignations versus firms with non-public resignations.
e Denotes the statistical significance of differences in changes in performance between
the two years prior and one year prior to the resignation year for each resignation
type sub-sample.
Data is collected using the proxy statement prior to the resignation announcement or
the year prior to the resignation year in the IRRC data base.
Stock ownership is defined as all beneficially owned stock, including options
exercisable within six months and stock held by family members that the board
member or executive disclaims any beneficial interest in.
The value of stock options is estimated using Black Scholes. Monthly return volatility is
estimated using up to 60 months worth of return data in period prior to option grant
(minimum number of observations used is 44). When time to maturity or average time
to maturity is missing 10 years is used. When the average exercise price and/or grant
date is missing, the stock price at the time of grant or at the time the proxy statement
is prepared is used.
Outside blockholders are 5% of more beneficial owners of stock with no obvious
affiliation with management as disclosed in the proxy statement and include insurance
companies, banks, mutual funds, public and private mutual funds, and investment
firms.
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Outside directors are not employees, former employees or related to any employees of
the firm, nor have any obvious affiliation with the firm or management, as disclosed in
the firm's proxy statement or independent directors as defined in the IRRC data base.
All financial data is measured for first (second, third) full fiscal year end prior to year
in which resignation is announced.
Data is collected from Compustat using Research Insight.
Total accruals are measured as TAt = ΔCAt − ΔCasht − ΔCLt + ΔSTDt − Dept; where
TA = total accruals; ΔCA = change in current assets; ΔCash = change in cash and
cash equivalents; ΔCL = change in current liabilities; ΔSTD = change in debt included
in current liabilities; Dep = Depreciation and amortization expense.
Differences in changes in performance, EBITDA and Sales, between two years prior
and one year prior to the resignation year are tested for each type of resignation
announcements sub-sample. There are no statistically significant differences in year to
year changes in performance measures for firms with resignations announcements for
“busy” related reasons or resignations that are non-public or year to year changes in
sales for firms with resignations announcements for “conflict” related reasons. The
median change in EBITDA scaled by assets year to year is statistically significantly
different at the 1% level for firms with resignation announcements for “conflict”
related reasons.
Month 1 is the month following the resignation announcements for the announcement
sample. For the comparison sample, Month 1 is January in the year following the
resignation year. Monthly returns for each firm in the sample as well as the return on
S&P 500 are collected starting in the month following the resignation announcement.
The market-adjusted performance for each firm for each time period is computed as
the geometric mean of 1 + the firm's performance minus the geometric mean of
1 + market's performance for 6 or 12 months following the announcement month. To
limit the influence of outliers on statistical tests market adjusted performance is
Winsorized at the 5% level.

Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 16, No. 1 (February 2010): pg. 38-52. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article
to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

37

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Table 7. Parameter estimates for logistic regression of reason is given with
resignation for a sample of 104 firms with outside director resignations from
1990–2003 (p-values in parentheses).
Likelihood that a Likelihood that a
“conflict” related
“busy” related
reason is given at reason is given at
outsider's
outsider's
resignation
resignation
announcement
announcement

Likelihood that
an outside
director leaves
with no public
announcement

Parameter
Intercept

− 1.1254 (0.5799)

− 2.3155 (0.0334)

− 7.5606
(< 0.0001)

Director is a
professional director

0.3978 (0.5718)

0.0523 (0.8806)

1.4252 (< 0.0001)

Director is a finance
professional

0.8608 (0.0726)

0.0571 (0.8529)

0.3767 (0.3785)

Age of director

− 0.0252 (0.2358)

0.0385 (0.0028)

0.0706 (0.0001)

Percentage stock
− 9.3457 (0.3797)
ownership by director

3.0751 (0.1852)

− 2.459 (0.5758)

CEO tenure/director
tenure

0.0221 (0.7527)

0.0996 (0.0019)

− 0.0194 (0.7501)

Director is on audit
committee

0.8446 (0.0720)

0.1603 (0.4721)

− 0.5748 (0.0739)

Director is on
compensation
committee

0.9246 (0.0422)

0.094 (0.6787)

− 1.3203 (0.0003)

Director is on
− 0.2508 (0.6808)
nominating committee

− 0.1179 (0.6360)

− 0.2544 (0.4769)

Board size

− 0.1305 (0.0050)

− 0.0803 (0.3252)

Percentage of outside − 0.0128 (0.5239)
directors on the board

0.0469 (< 0.0001)

− 0.00285
(0.8271)

CEO is chairman of
the board

− 0.0206 (0.9675)

− 1.2132
(< 0.0001)

0.5479 (0.0985)

CEO total
compensation as a
percentage of sales

− 0.2758 (0.3625)

− 1.9994
(< 0.0001)

0.0284 (0.0884)

Percentage of shares
outstanding held by
outside blockholders

0.0082 (0.7472)

− 0.1431
(< 0.0001)

0.0199 (0.1083)

(Change in EBITDA
from prior
year) / (total
beginning period
assets)

− 0.1798 (0.4844)

2.566 (< 0.0001)

− 0.8081 (0.0813)

− 0.4611
(< 0.0001)

0.1944 (0.0051)

− 0.067 (0.5628)

(Change in sales from − 0.2489 (0.1998)
prior year) / (total
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Likelihood that a Likelihood that a
“conflict” related
“busy” related
reason is given at reason is given at
outsider's
outsider's
resignation
resignation
announcement
announcement

Likelihood that
an outside
director leaves
with no public
announcement

Parameter
beginning period
assets)
(EBITDA from prior
year) / (total
beginning period
assets)

− 0.2499 (0.0901)

− 1.2267
(< 0.0001)

0.5864 (0.0013)

Change in (total
accruals / beginning
period assets)

0.8644 (0.0067)

− 0.4009 (0.1106)

− 1.3265 (0.0007)

Beta

− 0.962 (0.0087)

0.5678 (0.0053)

0.2462 (0.4307)

Log of total assets

0.0756 (0.6658)

− 0.1345 (0.11)

0.0368 (0.7926)

Likelihood ratio / chisquare

67.6265

386.3025

153.3482

Probability > chisquare

< 0.0001

< 0.0001

< 0.0001

N

1111

1111

1111

Statistics

For variable definitions see explanatory notes to Table 4 and Table 6.
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Table 8. Market adjusted return performance and frequency of events in the
year following the resignation for a sample of 104 firms with outside director
resignations from 1990–2003 (p-values in parentheses).
Panel A: Market adjusted performance
6 month
Mean

12-month
Median

Outside director
resignations for “conflict”
related reasons

27.87%*(0.0908) 15.97*(0.0834)

Outside director
resignations for “busy”
related reasons

− 4.39 (0.3787)

Outside director leaves
with no public
announcement

− 5.032 (0.1753)

Mean

Median

3.58
(0.7791)

8.49
(0.7733)

− 2.73
(0.3995)

− 8.36
(0.3628)

− 9.41
(0.3628)

− 9.25
(0.4885)

− 4.09
(0.6447)

− 11.13
(0.4885)

Panel B: Frequency of events
Firms with
resignation
announcements for
“conflict” related
reasons

Firms with
resignation
announcements for
“busy” related
reasons

Firms with outside
directors leaving
with no public
announcement

Event type
Asset
61.54%
restructuring

30.77 **b

67.31%

Control–
defense

34.62***a

7.69 *b

5.77%

Control–
external

11.54

0 **b

13.46%**c

Internal
control
change

57.69***a

33.33*b

3.85%***c

Other

15.79

8.00

26.92%

Notes: *, **, and *** reflect statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
All data measured in year prior to resignation year. For variable definitions see
explanatory notes to Table 6.
a Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “conflict” related
resignations versus all others.
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b Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “conflict” related
resignations versus firms with “busy” related resignations.
c Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “conflict” related
resignations versus firms with non-public resignations.
d Denotes the statistical significance of difference between firms with “busy” related
resignations versus firms with non-public resignations.
Monthly returns for each firm in the announcement sample as well as the return on
S&P 500 are collected starting in the month following the resignation announcement.
For the comparison sample returns are collected in January of the year following the
resignation. The market-adjusted performance for each firm for each time period is
computed as the geometric mean of 1 + the firm's performance minus the geometric
mean of 1 + market's performance for 6 or 12 months following the announcement
month. Seven firms have less than 6 months of return data. For months that data is
no longer available for these firms, their return is replaced with the return on the S&P
500. To limit the influence of outliers on the statistical test on the difference between
market adjusted performance between different types of resignation announcements,
market adjusted performance is Winsorized at the 5% level.
Asset restructuring includes acquisitions, closing a unit, spin-off, issuance or
repurchase of equity, or some other type of restructuring events.
Control defenses include adoption of a poison pill, another anti-takeover amendment,
or other defensive action.
Takeover related events include takeover rumors, bids, proxy fights, shareholder
litigation related to takeover issues, and outside block acquisitions.
Internal management changes include changes in the CEO or other top executives.
Other includes miscellaneous lawsuits and investigations by the SEC.
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Table 9. Regression estimates explaining market adjusted return
performance and likelihood of events in the year following the resignation for
a sample of 104 firms with outside director resignations from 1990–2003.
Six month market
adjusted
performance in
year after
resignation year

Likelihood of
internal
management
change in year
after resignation
year

Likelihood of
control defense
in year after
resignation year

Parameter
Intercept

− 0.79425 (0.1635)

− 6.9626 (0.2056)

− 7.1614
(0.1661)

“Conflict” related
reason given for
resignation

0.40132 (0.0506)

7.3247 (0.011)

1.3518 (0.4958)

“Busy” related
reason given for
resignation

− 0.13158 (0.4092)

4.0039 (0.0879)

− 0.7292
(0.6491)

A resigning outside − 0.18941 (0.1279)
director is a
professional director

− 2.1729 (0.1947)

− 0.0915
(0.9278)

A resigning outside
director is a finance
professional

− 0.00705 (0.9501)

− 1.784 (0.1449)

0.8316 (0.4074)

A resigning outside
director is on audit
committee

0.11624 (0.2923)

0.6822 (0.5308)

− 0.1381
(0.8932)

A resigning outside
director is on
compensation
committee

0.07621 (0.5401)

− 3.6106 (0.018)

1.3688 (0.206)

A resigning outside
director is on
nominating
committee

− 0.10991 (0.3966)

− 0.2725 (0.837)

0.5572 (0.5935)

Firm is delisted in
year after
resignation year

− 0.61501 (0.0106)

− 3.103 (0.0601)

− 0.3816
(0.8357)

An asset
restructuring event
occurs in year after
resignation year

− 0.2471 (0.0201)

1.8047 (0.0729)

0.144 (0.8784)

–

0.7501 (0.5242)

An internal
0.09756 (0.4858)
management
change event occurs
in year after
resignation year
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Six month market
adjusted
performance in
year after
resignation year

Likelihood of
internal
management
change in year
after resignation
year

Likelihood of
control defense
in year after
resignation year

Parameter
A control–defense
− 0.09346 (0.5171)
event occurs in year
after resignation
year

1.8302 (0.1377)

–

A control–external
− 0.21504 (0.3645)
event occurs in year
after resignation
year

− 15.5935 (0.9721)

3.2293 (0.0774)

Another type of
0.08103 (0.5648)
event occurs in year
after resignation
year

2.5711 (0.0508)

2.2432 (0.0368)

CEO is chairman of
the board

− 0.0253 (0.8054)

0.9407 (0.3811)

− 1.2014
(0.1509)

Board size

0.00118 (0.9623)

0.2338 (0.2301)

− 0.01 (0.9534)

Percentage of
outside directors on
the board

0.00667 (0.0957)

0.0462 (0.2188)

− 0.01 (0.9534)

CEO's percentage
stock ownership

0.00747 (0.3236)

0.0567 (0.3945)

− 0.0974
(0.2327)

CEO's total
compensation as a
percentage of
EBITDA

− 0.00108 (0.3162)

− 0.00939 (0.2949)

− 0.2051
(0.2985)

CEO's age

0.0108 (0.1419)

− 0.0306 (0.691)

0.0702 (0.2762)

Percentage of shares − 0.00009601
outstanding held by (0.9816)
outside blockholders

0.0205 (0.6558)

− 0.0185
(0.5924)

Six month market
adjusted
performance in the
year prior to
resignation year

− 0.04557 (0.7755)

–

–

Beta

− 0.00142 (0.9851)

0.0149 (0.9865)

− 0.6169 (0.346)

EBITDA/total
beginning period
assets in year prior
to resignation year

–

− 0.5869 (0.4383)

− 0.2051
(0.2985)

Log of total assets

− 0.02909 (0.4697)

− 0.4055 (0.2541)

0.403 (0.2236)

Statistics
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Six month market
adjusted
performance in
year after
resignation year

Likelihood of
internal
management
change in year
after resignation
year

Likelihood of
control defense
in year after
resignation year

Parameter
F-stat or likelihood
ratio / chi-square

1.52

63.6916

36.2374

Probability of > F
or > chi-square

0.0871

< 0.0001

0.0286

N

104

104

104

For variable definitions see explanatory notes to Table 4, Table 6 and Table 8.
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